As climate-related disasters intensify across the globe, the question of how to obtain redress for environmental damage has become increasingly urgent. Yet, public international law has so far struggled to provide effective remedies. The traditional framework of holding states responsible for environmental damage seems to fall short, especially in the context of complex cases of damages linked to climate change. In light of the growing needs to provide redress in such cases, it is important to consider existing but under-utilised frameworks for environmental reparation.
This blog post explores alternative approaches to addressing environmental damage under international law that go beyond the dominant state responsibility approach. These alternative approaches include risk allocation through strict liability regimes, international cooperation on an ad hoc basis, and the promotion of compliance with treaty obligations under non-compliance procedures set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). By examining these alternatives and related legal frameworks, we can better understand how to address environmental damage more effectively.
The Limitations of State Responsibility
Under international law, the traditional method for addressing environmental damage involves holding a state responsible for breaching its international obligations. However, this process is time-consuming and difficult to implement in practice. Establishing the responsibility of a state requires demonstrating the breach of an international obligation by that state, with clear evidence of attribution, typically before an international court or tribunal. Moreover, to obtain full reparation, it is necessary to prove that a damage has occurred and that there is a causal link between the breach and the damage. Both can be challenging for climate change-related damage where the conduct required from states under their international obligations may be unclear and where the causal link to greenhouse gas emissions is indirect and complex. The lack of consensus on how to quantify and compensate for environmental damage further undermines this approach. Consequently, although an important avenue for reparation, the state responsibility framework often fails to deliver practical, timely, and comprehensive reparation for environmental damage.
Risk Allocation: Strict Liability Regimes
Strict liability regimes offer a different approach to environmental reparation by focusing on risk allocation rather than “fault”. These regimes, established under international treaties such as the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, require compensation whenever a damage occurs as a result of a hazardous activity, regardless of whether a specific obligation has been breached. This effectively eliminates the need to prove a breach of an international obligation, making it easier to access remedies, particularly for damage caused by private actors such as corporations, since the latter are not directly bound by international obligations.
In practice, strict liability regimes have been established in areas such as oil pollution, nuclear damage, and space activities. They typically bind operators directly and focus on financial compensation. By holding actors financially accountable and therefore internalising the environmental costs of a given activity, these regimes incentivise preventative behaviour.
However, the risk allocation approach has its limits. First, it generally only provides financial compensation, which may be inadequate for certain types of irreversible damage, such as the extinction of a species due to rising temperatures. Second, strict liability only applies to specific activities covered by relevant treaties, and there is currently no regime establishing strict liability for greenhouse gas emissions. Third, the strict liability regimes set out under treaties only become operational upon their incorporation into the domestic legal frameworks of the respective state parties. Fourth, most liability regimes remain under-utilised, with the exception of oil pollution-related frameworks. Lastly, these regimes are designed to compensate for damage to persons or property resulting from hazardous activities, and do not generally cover environmental damage unless it is accompanied by such personal and/or economic damage. Despite these limits, strict liability has potential to contribute to climate-related reparation if creatively adapted.
International Cooperation: Ad Hoc Remediation Arrangements
States have also addressed environmental damage through case-specific agreements (such as the compensation agreement between the United States and Japan for nuclear testing carried out in Japan) and institutions (such as the United Nations Compensation Commission). These ad hoc remediation arrangements operate outside the formal framework of state responsibility and focus on addressing specific incidents, often without requiring proof of fault.
One example of such arrangements is bilateral compensation, as states often prefer to resolve disputes through informal settlements. A notable case is the no-fault compensation agreement under which the United States provided compensation to Japan for the effects of nuclear testing it conducted in Japan. However, the conclusion and execution of bilateral compensation agreements are highly contingent on political will, which limits their reliability and effectiveness as an avenue for climate reparation.
A more institutionalised example of ad hoc remediation arrangements is the United Nations Compensation Commission, established after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. With respect to the claims for the expenses resulting from measures to clean and restore the damaged environment, the Commission acknowledged environmental damage as a legitimate basis for reparation and used methods such as habitat equivalency analysis to assess damage based on ecological inputs. While context-specific, this model demonstrates how international institutions can support reparation in the presence of political will.
International reparation funds, such as the fund established under the Basel Convention on hazardous waste and the International Oil Compensation Funds, are other reparation mechanisms, and perhaps the most relevant to climate reparation. Since the lack of funding is a recurring issue in the reparation of damage associated with climate change, the creation of an international fund for such damage would increase the potential for effective redress. It could also help to address the root causes of climate change – for example, if an international fund for climate reparations were to be financed by the fossil fuel industry or other large greenhouse gas emitters. Such an approach is visible in the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, which are partly financed by oil transporters.
In line with article 11 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Parties have established various climate-specific funds, including the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund, and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD). These funds aim to support developing countries affected by climate change, reflecting an emerging consensus around historical responsibility. However, such funds face issues of underfunding, lack of transparency, and uneven implementation. Still, and although limited to financial compensation, their design could perhaps be improved to better support environmental reparation.
Promoting Compliance: Non-Compliance Procedures under Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)
In response to the limits of state responsibility, many MEAs have developed their own non-compliance mechanisms. These mechanisms focus on facilitating adherence to treaty obligations rather than penalising breaches.
Under the Paris Agreement, parties submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and report biennially on their implementation. The Paris Agreement’s enhanced transparency framework (EFT) and the Implementation and Compliance Committee aim to ensure accountability and support compliance through technical assistance. Despite the fact that climate actions undertaken are currently insufficient to reach the Paris Agreement’s targets, the innovative non-compliance procedures established by the Paris Agreement have facilitated the provision of financial assistance to less wealthy and more vulnerable countries, helping them to cope with the impacts of climate change.
The outcomes of such procedures are non-punitive and collaborative, acknowledging that non-compliance can be explained by various factors other than the intention to violate an international obligation, such as lack of capacity. Where this is the case, a facilitation measure, such as financial or technical support, can be taken to provide a state with the necessary means to bring its conduct into conformity with its treaty obligations.
There are certain limits to the ability of non-compliance procedures to address damage associated with climate change. The nature and scope of these procedures are treaty-specific, which means that they do not cover customary international law violations or the actions of non-party states. Some of these procedures are non-binding, and most are not specifically designed to provide for remedy. Nonetheless, their facilitative nature makes them relevant in addressing complex global challenges like climate change.
Conclusion: Time for Creative Rethinking of Existing Frameworks
This post has explored how environmental reparation can be achieved under international law beyond the traditional framework of state responsibility. The approaches examined — namely, risk allocation, international cooperation on an ad hoc basis, and the promotion of compliance with treaty obligations — each provide valuable avenues for addressing environmental damage.
While none of these mechanisms is a panacea, their respective merits suggest that they could be combined and adapted to better meet the needs of environmental justice. In the context of climate change, existing mechanisms such as international climate funds and the compliance architecture of the Paris Agreement offer important, though incomplete, pathways to reparation.
Recent developments, including renewed pledges to the Loss and Damage Fund and the adoption of the Advisory Opinion on climate change obligations by the International Court of Justice, signal a growing international interest in environmental reparation. As climate-related damage accelerate, there is a pressing need to revitalise these existing legal frameworks and explore more flexible, creative pathways to addressing environmental damage.