A 2024 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that over 2,500 wells and 500 platforms in the Gulf of Mexico were overdue for decommissioning (i.e., the process whereby wells are permanently plugged and associated infrastructure removed). Others have estimated that over 32,000 offshore wells in U.S. waters are either abandoned or idle, and are prime targets for decommissioning as well. Wells that are not decommissioned can leak oil and methane along with carcinogenic contaminants, such as benzene and arsenic, which pose major threats to health and the climate. A study found that it could cost as much as $30 billion to safely decommission offshore wells, with delays only increasing the cost, environmental risks, and financial burden on the taxpaying public. Decommissioning offshore wells is both essential and urgent.
By law, oil and gas operators are required to decommission offshore platforms and related infrastructure. Regulations issued under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) specify that wells are to be plugged and decommissioned when no longer useful for operations. Attempts to enforce these obligations by the responsible federal agencies– the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) – have been stymied by a number of obstacles, including insufficient financial assurances and bankruptcies. While the Biden administration took meaningful steps towards enforcing decommissioning obligations and limiting future offshore oil and gas development, the current administration has unsurprisingly reversed course, and is looking to expand its offshore oil and gas leasing in the Gulf of Mexico and California. Increased oil and gas leasing leads to more facilities that require decommissioning, with greater costs for the taxpayer.
Given the current administration’s goals, there is a greater need to identify a research and policy agenda for offshore decommissioning. On November 6, 2025, the Sabin Center for Climate Change, together with Ocean Conservancy, organized a meeting with former BSEE and BOEM regulators to identify key opportunities to reform decommissioning law and policy. This meeting served as an extension of the workshop hosted by the Sabin Center and Ocean Conservancy on May 5. The meeting was conducted under the Chatham House Rules to encourage open and frank discussion.
Key takeaways from the meeting are as follows:
Lessons learned during the Biden administration
The former regulators outlined several broad lessons from their work during the Biden administration, beginning with a discussion of BSEE’s decommissioning of the Matagorda Island wells and pipelines. The wells and pipelines of the Matagorda Island area, located approximately 12 miles off the Texas coast, were the first offshore facilities decommissioned by BSEE. The former regulators mentioned that deciding which wells were to be decommissioned were based in part on BSEE’s internal risk matrix, which noted that the wells were at high risk from hurricanes. Matagorda Island was also selected because its relative simplicity made it a useful model for future decommissioning efforts. Even so, however, the former regulators noted that there were significant challenges in enforcing the decommissioning obligations for the Matagorda Island wells and pipelines.
Before any lease exploration activity, the oil and gas company performing the activity must provide a financial assurance, such as a bond or guarantee, to ensure that the federal government has enough money to pay for decommissioning, even if the company declares bankruptcy. In practice, however, financial assurances are rarely sufficient to cover the decommissioning costs. The former regulators noted that limited funding forced the federal government to rely on funding from other sources, including the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.
As a takeaway, both from Matagorda Island and more broadly from their tenure prior to the current administration, the former regulators noted that it is essential for financial assurances to accurately reflect the cost of decommissioning, so that taxpayers do not foot the bill. They specified that many groups would need to work together, both within government agencies and outside of them, to successfully enforce decommissioning obligations. To that end, one participant pointed out that lawyers play a critical role in the decommissioning process by negotiating the details and clarifying liabilities.
The former regulators also noted that, during the Biden administration, there was an effort to strengthen financial assurance rules to protect taxpayers from bearing the costs of decommissioning. These rules are being revised by the current administration. The proposed revisions look to increase oil and gas leasing, without ensuring stronger safeguards to prevent the pitfalls of insufficient financial assurances.
During the Biden administration, BOEM was also working on a fitness to operate standard, which would establish safety, environmental, and financial responsibilities for offshore companies to meet. The fitness to operate standard intended to weed out companies unable to cover cleanup costs or guilty of safety and environmental infractions, by blocking “bad actor” companies from buying new leases. However, a lack of time and capacity prevented BOEM from finalizing the standards, and the publication of the standards was recently permanently halted by the current administration. One former regulator believed that, in the future, issues around fitness to operator should ideally be addressed in new legislation, including through adding restrictions on lease transfers.
Staffing and capacity
Capacity issues were repeatedly highlighted as constraining BOEM and BSEE’s work on decommissioning. The former regulators noted that, despite increased hiring during the Biden administration, staff shortages meant that there were no people focused specifically on decommissioning, and most of those working on the topic were doing so as an “add on” to their regularly assigned roles. One former regulator stated that this problem has gotten significantly worse under the current administration; BOEM has lost almost half of its staff in the past year as a result of the administration’s workforce cutting measures. Offshore decommissioning requires specialized expertise, much of which has likely been lost from BOEM and BSEE, which will hinder future decommissioning efforts.
The former regulators noted that the limited workforce came with several immediate consequences. BSEE and BOEM were unable to collect and categorize data. Wells would go idle, with no follow-up action from the regulators. One former regulator mentioned that this led to actions being taken without authority from a law or regulation. The participants also highlighted the increased challenge in enforcing decommissioning obligations caused by staffing cuts to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). The IBLA hears disputes over decommissioning obligations, including assignment and enforcement of liability (among other cases). The former regulators noted that staff cuts reduced the board’s ability to hear and determine cases, leaving a number of cases pending for long periods.
Bankruptcy
As noted in our June report, bankruptcy has been a major issue in decommissioning efforts, often shifting costs from the industry to the taxpayer. The former regulators noted that this was particularly an issue with smaller oil and gas companies, who were more prone to bankruptcy. The law provides some tools to enforce decommissioning despite bankruptcy, such as the imposition of joint and several liability on predecessor owners and operators. However, the former regulators noted that these tools were hindered by slow enforcement proceedings and insufficient financial assurances, and were worsened by the staffing cuts.
The participants highlighted that bankruptcy courts may not be the best forum to deal with offshore oil and gas companies who have pending decommissioning obligations. Given that the federal government is not a secured creditor in bankruptcy proceedings, there is limited scope for prioritizing the decommissioning obligations. However, the former regulators were unclear as to the ideal solution; there was disagreement as to whether the IBLA had the capacity or expertise to resolve bankruptcy cases, and any changes in forum would likely require amending existing contracts, and potentially require legislative change as well.
Moving Forward
Moving forward, the former regulators all stressed the importance of rebuilding capacity. Specifically, they highlighted the need to hire more specialists, including economists, lawyers, and engineers, with decommissioning expertise. They also pointed out the need for adopt stickier requirements—e.g., imposed through legislation–as much of the progress made by the Biden administration has been wiped out by the current administration.
The former regulators suggested a few options to further incentivize decommissioning. One believed that a deeper review of the economics behind decommissioning would propel further decommissioning efforts. As decommissioning requires specialized equipment and skills, such as specialized ships and labor, the participant theorized that decommissioning could be economically viable enough to sustain its own industry. Another suggested conditioning any future leasing of fossil fuels on the decommissioning of abandoned and idle wells, i.e., a new well can only be leased if a certain amount of abandoned or idle wells are decommissioned first. This, they reasoned, would limit costs incurred by the taxpaying public as it would limit the number of facilities present, but may require legislative amendments to successfully implement.
Taken as a whole, these opportunities for reform, conversations, and debates suggest several areas where more research and resources are needed to build technical, legal, and organizational capacity.