The parties to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention) and the 1996 Protocol to that Convention (London Protocol) are meeting this week. High on the agenda, as has been the case for the last decade and more, is “marine geoengineering including ocean fertilization.” The parties’ discussions on this topic could have a significant impact on international governance of marine carbon dioxide removal (mCDR)—a suite of approaches that aim to mitigate climate change by enhancing the ocean’s natural ability to uptake and store carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
At this year’s meeting, parties to the London Convention and London Protocol are considering adopting a series of assessment frameworks, which are intended to help countries determine whether certain mCDR projects are “legitimate scientific research” that is not contrary to the aims of the London Convention and London Protocol. This is important because the parties have previously said that only such research, and no other mCDR projects, should be allowed.
This blog first provides some background on mCDR governance under the London Convention and London Protocol. Second, it describes the assessment framework proposals, which include an update to one adopted in 2010 for ocean fertilization and two new assessment frameworks for ocean alkalinity enhancement (OAE) and ocean sinking of biomass. Third, the blog analyzes questions around the legal status of the assessment frameworks, if they are approved. Fourth, the blog discusses party debates about when economic interests in scientific research are impermissible. A follow up blog will discuss some of the takeaways after the meeting has concluded.
Brief Background on mCDR Governance under the London Convention and London Protocol
The London Convention and London Protocol are two separate but related treaties that aim to control marine pollution, in particular, pollution caused by ocean dumping which is defined to include any “deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures.” The London Convention has 87 parties and the London Protocol has 56 parties. The two treaties operate in parallel, with distinctions in the obligations they impose, but both require parties to adopt domestic laws governing ocean dumping.
mCDR has been a frequent topic of discussion among the parties to the London Convention and London Protocol over the last two decades. The parties have had to consider (among other things) whether mCDR techniques that add material to the ocean should be treated as dumping and, if so, how the treaties apply to them. (See this primer for more on the treaties’ application to mCDR.) As part of those discussions, in 2008, the parties adopted a non-binding decision stating that “ocean fertilization activities other than legitimate scientific research should not be allowed.” In 2010, the parties adopted an assessment framework to evaluate proposed ocean fertilization projects. The assessment framework establishes provisions for an initial assessment designed to assess whether a project has the proper scientific attributed to be considered legitimate scientific research, and includes provisions on environmental assessment and monitoring of projects. According to the framework, only projects that do not present unacceptable risks to the marine environment should be allowed. (See here for a case study on the application of the assessment framework to a proposed ocean fertilization field trial.)
The parties to the London Protocol, but not the London Convention, adopted an amendment on marine geoengineering activities in 2013. That amendment is intended to create a legally binding regulatory framework for listed activities. To date, ocean fertilization is the only listed activity. The amendment also has yet to enter into force. In the absence of this binding legal framework, the parties are continuing to explore nonbinding decisions aimed at governing mCDR activities.
In a 2023 statement, the parties stated that OAE and ocean sinking of biomass for mCDR should be treated similarly to ocean fertilization, meaning that some legitimate scientific research may be allowed but deployment should be deferred. Since then, the parties have been working to develop assessment frameworks to guide the evaluation of proposed OAE and biomass sinking research projects, and on other issues related to implementation of the 2023 statement.
Assessment Framework Proposals
In recent years, a subset of parties to the London Convention and Protocol have been working to update the 2010 assessment framework for ocean fertilization and develop similar frameworks for OAE and biomass sinking. The frameworks are intended as a tool to help parties determine whether proposed projects constitute legitimate scientific research and are not contrary to the aims of the London Convention and Protocol.
The proposed updated assessment framework for ocean fertilization includes a number of notable changes from the previous 2010 version. Among other things, the updated framework adds details to the criteria that must be evaluated as part of the initial assessment of whether a project qualifies as legitimate scientific research. For example, the 2010 version required that research projects be “designed to answer questions that will add to the body of scientific knowledge” and that the researcher provide a “clear justification for why the expected outcomes cannot be reasonably achieved by other methods. In addition:
- The updated framework clarifies that in-ocean activities should be predated by lab or mesocosm study.
- The updated framework adds detail around the provision, in the 2010 framework, that research projects should not be influenced by “economic interests” and should not result in any “economic gain” (more on that below). And it specifies additional requirements around peer review of research projects and outputs.
- The updated framework adds considerable detail to the consultation process parties should undertake with stakeholders, including outlining the process for identifying and notifying potentially affected stakeholders, sharing information, and undertaking ongoing consultation.
- The updated framework adds several risk management strategies that parties can take, including operational restrictions, monitoring plans, compliance monitoring, and contingency monitoring.
The proposed new assessment frameworks for OAE and biomass sinking are largely the same as the updated ocean fertilization framework. This is intentional, as the parties are aiming for the three assessment frameworks to be aligned in their text. But, of course, each framework applies to different types of activities. Defining what’s covered by each has proved somewhat contentious (see here).
In the case of ocean fertilization, the parties to the London Convention and London Protocol defined that term in a 2008 decision as “any activity undertaken by humans with the principal intention of stimulating primary productivity in the oceans.” This definition was incorporated into the 2010 assessment framework and continued to be used in the new update.
The parties have been working on, but have not yet formally agreed on, definitions of OAE and biomass sinking. The current “working definitions” are:
- OAE means “any activity undertaken by humans to introduce matter to increase the alkalinity of seawater to enhance the uptake of atmospheric [carbon dioxide] by the ocean (i.e. change the air-to-sea [carbon dioxide] partial pressure gradient) or to counteract ocean acidification;” and
- Ocean sinking of biomass means “any activity undertaken by humans to introduce, including by sinking, biological matter, such as marine or terrestrial plant matter, into the sea to store carbon in the ocean.”
Legal Status of the Assessment Frameworks
At this week’s meeting, the parties to the London Convention and London Protocol are not only discussing whether to adopt the assessment frameworks, but also what their status will be if they are adopted. The latter raises particularly thorny legal questions.
As noted above, in 2013, the parties to the London Protocol adopted an amendment which states that parties may only permit ocean fertilization research projects that are “assessed as constituting legitimate scientific research taking into account any specific placement assessment framework.” The updated ocean fertilization assessment framework is intended to serve as the “specific” framework used for that purpose. But the 2013 amendment has not yet entered into force so the parties aren’t, strictly speaking, legally bound by it. (There is, though, a requirement under international law that States refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty they’ve agreed to).
The issues are even more complex when it comes to the assessment frameworks for OAE and biomass sinking. Those activities are not even covered by the 2013 amendment. While the parties have been considering expanding the amendment to cover them, some have said this is premature before the amendment enters into force. In these circumstances, what is the legal status of the assessment frameworks, and what weight do they carry under international law? This question takes on greater importance given that, like many international agreements, the London Convention and London Protocol are enforced at the domestic level and operationalized through domestic law.
At the 2025 annual meeting, the parties established reestablished the Legal Intersessional Correspondence Group on Marine Geoengineering (LICG). One of the tasks for the LICG was to “clarify how to apply” the three draft assessment frameworks. In July 2026, the LICG submitted a report to the parties on that issue, and that report is under consideration at the meeting this week. The report stated that many delegations view the assessment frameworks as best practice guidance intended to support the 2013 London Protocol amendment, and some stated that they provide practical guidance beyond the amendment’s minimum requirements. A number of delegations emphasized that the assessment frameworks do not create new legally binding obligations. Further, they recognized that parties retain discretion in their domestic permitting processes, and therefore the frameworks should preserve flexibility to accommodate different domestic legal systems.
These statements about the need for flexibility in implementation are in some tension with the language in the assessment frameworks themselves. The frameworks state that the parties should “ensure that all steps in the assessment receive full consideration before a final decision is made as to whether to allow or deny a proposed project” except in instances where unacceptable impacts are considered likely, in which case the proposal may be rejected more quickly. Further, by their terms, the assessment frameworks are intended to apply to “every experiment, regardless of size or scale.”
If the assessment frameworks are adopted, party discretion to stray from their terms is likely to be a source of continuing tension. This is likely to influence debates about whether to adopt the frameworks in the first place. It also will influence debates around the language the parties agree to on how to view the assessment frameworks and how they should be applied. It will be interesting to see whether and how both issues are resolved at this week’s meeting.
Defining Economic Interests
Another key issue before the parties this week is around acceptable financing of proposed mCDR research projects. As noted above, the 2010 assessment framework for ocean fertilization states that “[e]conomic interests should not influence the design, conduct and/or outcomes of the proposed activity” and there should be no “financial and/or economic gain” arising from the project. There have long been questions about what this means. For example, does it just prevent an entity generating and selling carbon credits from a research project? Or does it go further and prohibit any activity that could, down the line, lead to “economic or financial gain” (e.g., through generating intellectual property)? If so, what does that mean for research projects advanced by private companies, which are behind many of the field trials currently underway or planned?
In the updated ocean fertilization assessment framework, the parties have added language clarifying that the restriction on “financial and/or economic gain” “should not preclude payment for services rendered in support of the experiment or future financial impacts of patented technology.” This same language is included in the assessment frameworks for OAE and biomass sinking.
While the clarification regarding future financial impacts is helpful, many important questions remain unresolved, including:
- Whether carbon credits may be used to finance a research project. A number of parties are arguing that the sale or pre-sale of carbon credits would be impermissible, while others argue that projects using carbon credit sales should be assessed on a case by case basis. Those latter parties argue that carbon credit sales may be permissible provided that appropriate safeguards are in place to preserve scientific integrity and independence. Some parties argue for a distinction between carbon credits used to support or finance research activities and credits used as part of a broader commercial business model.
- Whether public and private finance should be treated differently. Some parties argue that public and private finances should not be treated the same, given that public funding may pursue broader public policy objectives and has different potential conflicts of interest than private financing. Many other delegations argue that the operative question is whether the finances influence the design, conduct, or outcomes, regardless of whether they are public or private.
- What safeguards are needed where private funding is involved? Parties are considering whether to adopt language on a number of safeguards intended to preserve scientific integrity, including declarations of conflicts of interest, independent oversight, methodological transparency, disclosure of research, and separation of roles between researchers, verifiers and funding entities.
Conclusion
As the above discussion shows, there are a number of unresolved questions for the parties on mCDR governance. The relevant debates could have significant implications for both national governments’ and private companies’ roles in the fast-evolving field of mCDR research. After the meeting wraps up, the authors will follow up with a blog on key takeaways.